Traditional definitions of the security of encryption schemes assume that the messages encrypted are chosen independently of the randomness used by the encryption scheme. Recent works, implicitly by Myers and Shelat (FOCS'09) and Bellare et al (AsiaCrypt'09), and explicitly by Hemmenway and Ostrovsky (ECCC'10), consider randomness-dependent message (RDM) security of encryption schemes, where the message to be encrypted may be selected as a function-referred to as the RDM function-of the randomness used to encrypt this particular message, or other messages, but in a circular way. We carry out a systematic study of this notion.
Introduction
Traditional definitions of secure encryption, including semantic (or CPA) security and CCA security, address the problem of how to securely communicate a message in the presence of a polynomiallybounded adversary that observes encrypted messages. In the standard approach, it is assumed that the message, the keys, and the randomness used to encrypt the message, are all chosen independently.
More recently, new definitions have emerged that relax some of these independence assumptions. Most notably, a line of work initiated independently by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [20] and by Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton [13] addresses the problem of "key-dependent" messages (KDM): namely, they consider the security of a public-key encryption scheme in a setting where the message to be encrypted may (adversarially) depend on the secret-key. A variant of this notion instead considers "circular" security: here, the adversary may observe a "cycle" of q messages − → m encrypted using different keys ( − → pk, − → sk), but where m i may depend on the depends on the secretkey sk (i+1 mod q) . One motivation for studying key-dependence arises in the context of hard-drive encryption: you want to encrypt your hard-drive, on which your secret-key is also found. Circular security arises naturally in a situation when two parties want to share their secret keys with each other (but not with the rest of the world): a natural solution to the problem would be for player 1 to send an encrypted version of his secret key using player 2's public key, and vice versa. For this protocol to be secure, circular security is needed. More recently, circular security has found important applications in the context of fully-homomorphic encryptions (indeed, to date, all known FHE schemes rely on the assumption that some underlying encryption scheme is circularly secure).
We here focus on an alternative relaxation of the classic independence assumptions, first implicitly considered by Myers and Shelat [38] and Bellare et al [10] , and explicitly by Hemmenway and Ostrovsky [33] : We study of the security of encryption schemes in a scenario where the message to be encrypted may be selected as a function-referred to as the RDM function-of the randomness used to encrypt this particular message, or other messages, but in a circular way. More precisely, in analogy with KDM security and circular security, we consider two notions of randomness dependent message security.
• Randomness-dependent message (RDM) security: roughly speaking, a public-key encryption scheme is said to be RDM-secure if indistinguishability of ciphertexts holds even if the encrypted messages are chosen as a function of the randomness used to encrypt this particular message.
• Circular randomness-dependent (circular-RDM) security: roughly speaking, a public-key encryption scheme is said to be circular RDM-secure if indistinguishability of ciphertexts holds even if the encrypted messages are chosen as a function of the randomness used to encrypt other messages, but in a circular way. More precisely, we consider a scenario where q messages − → m are encrypted using randomness − → r , where m 1 is chosen as a function of r q and each other message m i is chosen as a function of r i−1 and the "previous" ciphertext c i−1 = Enc pk (m i−1 , r i−1 ).
Why care about Randomness-Dependent Message Security We consider two reasons to study RDM security:
1. involuntary RDM attacks: Implementations of secure protocols are prone to programming mistakes; attacks exploiting such programming mistakes (e.g., buffer overflow attacks) have been demonstrated on secure protocols. Attacks of this type may allow an attacker to see encryptions of randomness dependent messages, even if the original protocol chooses messages independently of the randomness used to encrypt it. RDM security would block such "involuntary" RDM attacks.
To prevent against these we need to be able to handle sufficiently general classes of RDM functions that may be produced by the attackers.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal Statement).
There does not exist an encryption scheme that is (fully) q-circular RDM-secure for any polynomial q.
Bounded RDM security Since "unbounded" RDM security is impossible, we consider RDM security with respect to restricted classes of RDM functions. Our first positive result demonstrates that if the RDM function is restricted to be a circuit of a priori polynomially bounded size, then any secure encryption scheme can be modified to satisfy both RDM and circular-RDM security.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal Statement
. Assume the existence of a secure public key encryption scheme. Then, for every polynomial s, there exists an encryption scheme Π that is RDM secure when restricting the RDM function to be computed by a circuit of size at most s(k) where k is the security parameter. Additionally Π is q-circular RDM secure for every polynomial q under the same restrictions on the RDM function. Theorem 1.3 is proven by modifying any secure encryption scheme to first "hash" the randomness using a t-wise independent hash-function. The same transformation was previously used by Hemmenway and Ostrovsky [33] to transform "lossy encryption schemes" [44] , that can encrypt messages longer than the randomness, into schemes that satisfy a notion of circular-RDM "onewayness" 2 (as opposed to semantic security) with respect to a particular circular-RDM function (the identity function).
In order to encrypt a message m, our encryption scheme requires using |m| + ω(log k) bits; that is, the randomness used to encrypt a message needs to be sufficiently longer than the message being encrypted (as such, the encryption scheme of Theorem 1.3 does not handle "the identity function" as an RDM function.) Our next positive result strictly strengthens the conclusion of Theorem 1.3 (but under a stronger assumption) and the results of [33] : the existence of lossy trapdoor functions [45] implies the existence of both bounded RDM-secure and bounded circular-RDM secure encryption schemes that can encrypt also "long" messages using "short" randomnessthe ratio between the message-length and the randomness length is proportional to the lossiness of the trapdoor function. Our construction mirrors a construction of hedged encryption of Bellare et al [10] ; roughly, the encryption is done by first "hashing" the message-randomness pair and then applying a lossy trapdoor function to the hashed value. The key difference is that we replace the use of univeral hashing (in the construction of [10] ) with t-wise independent hashing. 3 Theorem 1.4 (Informal Statement). Assume the existence of "sufficiently" lossy trapdoor functions (the existence of which are implied e.g., by the DDH assumption). Then, for every polynomials s, l, there exists a l(k)-bit encryption scheme Π using only k-bits of randomness that is RDM secure (and q-circular RDM secure for every polynomial q), when restricting the RDM function to be computed by a circuit of size at most s(k) where k is the security parameter.
To prove the above two theorems we develop several new information-theoretic tools regarding t-wise independent hash functions, that may be of independent interests. For instance, with very high probability, a t-wise independent hash functions is a "good" randomness extractor for any minentropy source with with computationally-bounded leakage (mirroring a lemma of Trevisan-Vadhan [46] ). We also present "crooked" versions of such deterministic extraction lemmas (mirroring the "crooked left-over-hash lemma of [24] ).
An interesting question is whether any encryption schemes can be modified by simply performing some pre-processing to the randomness (as in Theorem 1.3) to become bounded RDM secure, but still handle long messages using short randomness. At first sight, it may seem like we could use a pseudorandom generator to "stretch" a small seed into the required long random string for the construction in Theorem 1.3. We have no attack against this construction. However, we show that security reductions that only use the attacker and the RDM function as a black-box-following [29] , we refer to such reductions as strongly black-box -cannot be used to demonstrate RDM security of encryption schemes with perfect correctness and efficiently recognizable public-keys that can encrypt long messages using short randomness, based on a falsifiable intractability assumption [39] ; for instance, this means that the El-Gamal crypto system cannot be modified (by performing pre-processing to the randomness) to become bounded RDM secure for long messages. Theorem 1.5 (Informal statement). Assume the existence of one-way functions secure against subexponential-sized circuits. For every polynomials m and r such that m(k) ≥ r(k)+ω(log k), there exists a polynomial s such that for every m(·)-bit encryption scheme Π with perfect correctness and efficiently recognizable public-keys that uses r(·) bits of randomness to encrypt a message, s-bounded security of Π cannot be based on any falsifiable assumption using a strongly black-box reduction, unless the assumption is false.
Let us point out that the reason Theorem 1.5 does not contradict Theorem 1.4 is that in the construction used to prove Theorem 1.4, valid ("injective") public-keys are indistinguisbale from invalid ("lossy") public-keys, and thus the schemes does not have efficiently recognizable publickeys.
RDM security beyond encryption We note that the notion of RDM security applies not only to encryption but makes sense also in the context of more general cryptographic protocols. For instance, the notion of RDM security directly extends to commitments-just as in the case of encryption, we here let the RDM function select the messages to be committed to as a function of the committer's randomness. We remark that Theorem 1.1 readily extends also to rule out (even computationally binding and computationally-hiding) RDM-secure commitments. Additionally, Theorem 1.3 extends to show that any commitment scheme in the CRS model can be turned into a bounded RDM secure commitment scheme in the CRS model. However, Theorem 1.5 does not extend to the setting to commitments-using a collision-resistant hash function, any RDM secure commitment for short messages can be turned into a RDM-secure commitment for long messages. The above results for commitment schemes can be found in the full version of this work.
We leave an exploration of RDM security for other tasks (e.g., zero-knowledge and witness indistinguishability-where the RDM function may select the statement and witness to the proved as a function of the prover's randomness, or secure computation-where the RDM function may select a player's input as a function of his randomness) for future work.
On the Soundness of the Random-Oracle Methodology Starting with the work of Canetti, Goldreich and Halevi [21, 22] , there are several "uninstantiability results" for the random oracle model [7] , showing schemes that are secure in the random oracle model, but where every instantiation of random oracle with a concrete (efficient) function leads to an insecure protocol (see e.g., [5, 28, 36] ). Another vein of work shows tasks (as opposed to schemes) that can be securely implemented in the random oracle model, but for which there are no secure implementations in the standard model (see e.g., [41, 42, 9] ). As far as we know, all these separations for tasks, however, make a relatively strong use of the random oracle model; [41, 9] rely on the security reduction "programming the random oracle", and [42] relies on the security reduction "seeing all the queries to the random oracle". Thus, it is conceivable that a weaker usage of random oracles may circumvent these uninstantiability results. For instance, Unruh [47] introduced a weaker random oracle model where the adversary may get an (inefficient) non-uniform advice about the random oracle, and suggested that proofs of security in this weaker random oracle model may still be "sound". We here address this question using RDM-secure encryption as a task.
We show that in the random-oracle model the existence of public-key encryption schemes imply the existence of "fully" RDM secure encryption schemes (i.e., without restricting the RDM function); our scheme is essentially identical to the hedged encryption scheme of [10] (but the analysis is quite different given the different security goals). 4 Our use of the random oracle model is extremely weak: we do not need to "program it", or "see queries to it", and security holds even the attacker may get any inefficient non-uniform advice about it (as in the model of [47] ). (The only property we need of the random oracle is that it acts as a k log k -wise indepedent hash function.) We refer to such a model as the "ultra-weak" Random Oracle Model. Theorem 1.6 (Informal Statement). Assume the existence of a secure public key encryption scheme. Then, there exists a encryption scheme Π that is "fully" RDM secure in the "ultra-weak" Random Oracle Model. Theorem 1.6, combined with our impossibility result (Theorem 1.1), thus yields an example of an arguably natural task (i.e., RDM-secure encryption) that can be securely implemented in the ultra-weak random-oracle model, but not in the standard model. Let us point out that a cruicial aspect of the security proof of our RO-based scheme is that the RDM function is not allowed to query the random oracle; in case we allow it to query the random oracle, our impossibility result still holds.
Related Work
As mentioned in the introduction, (circular) RDM security was first implicitly considered by Myers and Shelat [38] and explicitly by Hemmenway and Ostrovsky [33] . [38] [35] demonstrate semantic security of encryption schemes of a specific type of circular RDM attack, but do not formally introduce a notion of RDM security. Hemmenway and Ostrovsky [33] provide the first formal definition of RDM-secure encryption schemes, but only investigate, and provide constructions of, schemes satisfying the weaker notion of "circular-RDM one-wayness". As far as we know, we are the first to explicitely study the feasibility of satisfying (circular-)RDM semantic security (as opposed to one-wayness). As mentioned above, Bellare et al [10] study hedged encryption schemes that are closely related to RDM-secure encryption schemes; such encryption schemes are RDM secure if restricting the attacker to using RDM functions that do not depend on the public-key. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the constructions of both Bellare et al and Hemmenway and Ostrovsky are very useful to us.
As mentioned in the introduction, the related notion of key-dependent message (KDM) security was first introduced by Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton in 2002 [13] , who demonstrated the possibility of achieving their definition in the random-oracle model. The related notion of circular security (in which there exists a cycle of ciphertexts where each message depends on the previous secret key) was independently and concurrently introduced by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [20] , who also showed constructions in the random-oracle model. Follow-up work considered messagedependent PRFs [31] and symmetric encryption [34, 4] in the standard model. In [30] barriers to constructing KDM secure schemes for general classes of key-dependencies. In 2008, Boneh, Halevi, Hamburg, and Ostrovsky presented the first KDM-secure public-key encryption scheme [15] ; their construction was based on the DDH assumption. Subsequent work developed schemes that were KDM secure and CCA2 secure [19] , KDM secure and resilient to leakage on the secret key [6] , circular secure under alternative assumptions [16] , and circular secure against larger classes of functions [17] . Recent work has also shown that there exist schemes that are secure under standard definitions but which are not 2-circular secure [1, 23] .
A separate, but related line of related work focuses on leakage-resilient encryption (see e.g., [37, 25, 2, 3, 40, 18] ). In a sense, RDM security can be viewed as a CPA security game where the attacker gets to see some leakage on the encryptor's randomness before selecting the messages; indeed, in our positive results, this view will be instrumental.
Preliminaries
For a distribution S, s ← S means that s is chosen according to distribution S. For a set S, s ← S means that s is chosen uniformly from the set S. U n denotes the uniform distribution over n-bit strings. For a probabilistic algorithm A, A(x; r) denotes the output of A running on input x with randomness r; A(x) denotes the output of A on input x with uniformly chosen randomness. All logarithms are base 2 unless otherwise specified. We say that a function ε : N → [0, 1] is negligible if for every constant c ∈ N, ε(n) < k −c for sufficiently large k.
Statistical Distance and Computational Indistinguishability
Definition 2.1 (Statistical Difference). The statistical difference between two probability distributions X, Y is defined by ∆(X,
The statistical difference between two ensembles {X k } k and {Y k } k is a function δ defined by δ(k) = ∆(X k , Y k ). Two probability ensembles are said to be statistically close if their statistical difference is negligible. We also say X k and Y k are statistically close if ∆(X k , Y k ) ≤ (k) for some negligible function . 
Entropy
Definition 2.3. [Min-Entropy] The min-entropy of a random variable X, denoted H ∞ (X) is defined by H ∞ (X) = − log(max x Pr[x ← X]). Definition 2.4 (k-source). A random variable X is a k-source if H ∞ (X) ≥ k.
Hash Functions and Extractors
We use the standard t-wise independent hash functions and randomness extractors.
Definition 2.5 (t-wise Independent Hash Functions). A family of hash functions H = {h : S 1 → S 2 } is t-wise independent if the following two conditions hold:
1. ∀x ∈ S 1 , the random variable h(x) is uniformly distributed over S 2 , where h ← H.
2. ∀x 1 = · · · = x t ∈ S 1 , the random variables h(x 1 ), . . . , h(x t ) are independent, where h ← H.
Public-key Encryption Schemes
We now recall the formal definitions of public-key encryption schemes and its standard CPA security.
Definition 2.7 (Public-Key Encryption). An l-bit public-key encryption scheme consists of a triple Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) of PPT algorithms where (i) Gen takes a security parameter 1 k as input and generates a pair of public and secret key (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 k ), (ii) Enc takes a public key pk and a message m in a message space {0, 1} l(k) as input and generates a ciphertext c ← Enc pk (m), (iii) Dec is a deterministic algorithm that takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext c as input and outputs m = Dec sk (c), and (iv) there exists a negligible function µ such that for every k ∈ N, for random (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 k ),
where the probability is taken over the randomness of Gen and the randomness of the encryption. We say that Π has perfect correctness if the above condition holds for µ(k) = 0.
We recall the standard definitions of CPA and CCA security. 
We say Π is CCA-secure if the above holds when A 2 has access to a decryption oracle but is not allowed to query the decryption oracle with the challenge ciphertext c.
Remark. In the above definition and for essentially all the results in this paper, we consider a uniform polynomial-time attacker A. In case security holds against also non-uniform polynomialtime attackers, we refer to the scheme as being non-uniformly CPA/CCA secure. As is often the case, all our constructions in uniform setting directly extend also to the case of non-uniform security (if assuming that the underlying schemes are non-uniformly secure).
Note that the above definition assumes that messages encrypted are chosen independently of the randomness used by the encryption algorithm.
Definitions
In this section, we formally define two notions of randomness-dependent message security for encryption schemes.
Our first definition is essentially equivalent to the definition of RDM security due to Hemmenway and Ostrovsky [33] . In this definition, messages are adversarially chosen functions (after seeing the public key) of the randomness used for encryption: we say the encryption scheme is secure if the adversary cannot distinguish between encryptions of different functions of the randomness. 
and R is the encryption randomness length of Π. The RDM functions f b are represented as circuits from {0, 1} |r| to {0, 1} l(k) We say Π is RDM-CCA-secure if the above holds when A 2 has access to a decryption oracle but is not allowed to query the decryption oracle with the challenge ciphertext c.
We remark that by a standard hybrid argument, we can assume without loss of generality that the adversary A 1 always choose f 1 to be a constant function f 1 = 0. As mentioned, Definition 3.1 is essentially identical to the notion of RDM security defined by Hemmenway and Ostrovsky [33] : the definition of [33] is a multi-message version of Definition 3.1 where the attacker gets to see a sequence of encrypted messages (that may depend in a correlated way on the randomness used to encrypt them), and thus the definition of [33] implies Definition 3.1. (Looking forward, since we are proving an impossibility result regarding Definition 3.1, considering a weaker definition makes our results stronger.)
Consider a sequence of encryptions where messages are functions of the previous (but most recent) encryption randomness and ciphertext. Security in this setting is guaranteed by CPA security, since encryption randomness is still independent of the messages. However if this dependency is circular, it is unclear whether or not we have security. We now formally introduce this notion of circular randomness dependent message security. 
and R is the encryption randomness length of Π. The RDM functions f i b are represented as circuits as defined in Definition 3.1.c denotes the vector (c 1 , c 2 , . . . c n ). Furthermore, Π is circular RDM secure if Π is k c -circular RDM secure for every constant c. q-circular-CCA and circular-CCA RDM security are defined in analogous way.
Remark. Note that by a hybrid argument, we can assume without loss of generality that A always choose f i 1 = 0 for every i ∈ [q]. We will use this observation later in the proof of Theorem 5.6.
We also define relaxations of RDM security and circular RDM security where we restrict the RDM function to be computable by circuits of a priori bounded size. Definition 3.3. Let s : N → N be efficiently computable. An l-bit public key encryption scheme Π is s-bounded RDM secure (resp., s-bounded (q-)circular RDM secure) if Π is RDM secure (resp., (q-)circular RDM secure) under the additional restriction that in the corresponding security game, the adversary A 1 can only output RDM functions computable by circuits of size bounded by s(k). CCA security is defined analogously.
RDM Security and Our Impossibility Results
In this section we prove that both RDM-security and q-circular security are impossible to achieve. Throughout this section, we focus on bit-encryption schemes; this only makes our results stronger. We first establish the impossibility result on the RDM-secure encryption schemes; our techniques (of using pairwise independent hashfunctions to signal a message) are similar to those used by Bellare and Keelveedhi [12] in a different context. Theorem 4.1. For every 1-bit encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec), Π is not RDM-secure.
Proof. Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a 1-bit encryption scheme. We construct a PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) that breaks the RDM security of Π. The idea is to use f b to signal the bit b in the RDM Π b experiment by pairwise independent hash functions. Fix a security parameter k ∈ N. Let C denotes the ciphertext space of Π for the corresponding security parameter k, and let H = {h : C → {0, 1}} be a pairwise independent hash function family that hashes ciphertexts to a bit. Our adversary A uses h ← H to construct functions f b,h for b ∈ {0, 1} that signals the bit b as follows.
• A 1 (1 k , pk): A 1 samples h ← H and outputs (f 0,h , f 1,h , h), where for b ∈ {0, 1}, f b,h on input r, outputs a message m ∈ {0, 1} such that h(Enc pk (m, r)) = b if such an m exists; otherwise f b,h outputs m = 0.
• A 2 (c, h): A 2 simply outputs one bit h(c).
To show that A breaks the RDM security of Π, it suffices to show the following claim, which clearly implies RDM Π 0 (A, k) and RDM
Proof. Note that the output of RDM
When this is the case, by the pairwise independence,
It follows by an union bound that
We proceed to establish the impossibility result on the circular RDM-secure encryption schemes. Theorem 4.3. For every 1-bit encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec), Π is not q-circular RDMsecure for every efficiently computable and polynomially bounded q.
We prove Theorem 4.3 by showing that in fact, circular RDM security implies RDM security.
Theorem 4.4. Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a 1-bit encryption scheme, and q : N → N be efficiently computable and polynomially bounded. If Π is q-circular RDM-secure, then Π is RDM-secure. Theorem 4.3 follows by combining Theorem 4.1 and 4.4. Before presenting the formal proof of Theorem 4.4, we first discuss the proof for the special case that Π has perfect correctness and that q = 2, to illustrate the idea behind the proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that breaks the RDM security of Π, we want to construct a PPT adversary B that breaks the 2-circular security of Π.
The idea is to let B simulate the attack of A in the circular RDM security game using the second message (in general, using the last message). More precisely, recall that in the RDM security game RDM Π b , A generates RDM functions f 0 and f 1 , and receives c = Enc pk (f b (r); r). To simulate the attack of A in CIR
in a way so that B will receivec = (c 1 , c 2 ) with c 2 = Enc pk (f b (r 2 ); r 2 ). Then B can output whatever A 2 outputs on input c 2 , and break the circular RDM security with the same advantage as A. Now, the key observation is that the RDM function f 2 b (r 1 , c 1 ) can in fact decrypt c 1 to get the message f 1 b (r 2 ) by checking whether c 1 equals to Enc pk (0, r 1 ) or Enc pk (1, r 1 ) (the perfect correctness implies Enc pk (0, r 1 ) = Enc pk (1, r 1 ) and the decryption will be always correct). Thus, B can let
, and by doing so B will receive c 2 = Enc pk (f 2 b (r 1 , c 1 ), r 2 ) = Enc pk (f b (r 2 ), r 2 ), as desired. This completes the proof of the special case.
We can readily extend the proof to the general q-circular RDM security, by letting B set
On the other hand, the imperfect correctness only causes negligible probability of decryption errors, and reduce the advantage of B by a negligible amount. We proceed to present a formal proof.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A that breaks the RDM security of Π. Namely, there exists a PPT distinguisher D and a non-negligible function ε(·) such that for every k ∈ N,
We construct a P P T adversary B that breaks the q-circular RDM security of Π as follows.
• B 1 (1 k , pk):
, and outputs 1 otherwise.
• B 2 (c, state): B 2 simply outputs A 2 (c q , state).
We claim that for b ∈ {0, 1},
and completes the proof. To prove the claim, we note that the correctness of Π implies that there exist negligible functions µ and η such that for at least 1
By a union bound,
Positive Results

Bounded RDM Security
In the previous sections we have seen that RDM security and circular RDM security are impossible to achieve. In this section we see how we can achieve the weaker notions of bounded RDM security and bounded circular RDM security. In fact we achieve a stronger notion of RDM security which implies both of the above.
This strong RDM security is in fact security in the presence of randomness leakage (such that the leakage function size is a priori bounded by a polynomial) which is available to the adversary when it chooses the messages to encrypt. 
R is the encryption randomness length of Π and f : {0, 1} |r| → {0, 1} p(k) is a function computed by a circuit of size at most s(k). CCA security is defined analogously.
We show that any secure encryption scheme can be compiled to a bounded strong RDM-secure encryption scheme (with "long" encryption randomness).
Theorem 5.2. Assume the existence of a CPA (resp., CCA) secure public key encryption scheme. Then, there exists a l-bit s-bounded p-strong RDM-secure (resp., RDM-CCA-secure) encryption scheme for every polynomial l, s and p.
We start by providing a construction that converts any secure encryption scheme to bounded strong RDM secure encryption scheme. The main idea is that though leakage degrades the randomness, the randomness is long enough to have enough residual min-entropy so that the random bits necessary for encryption can be extracted from it. The problem with this is that the extractor seed will have to be part of the public key, and the adversary can choose a leakage function after seeing the public key. Hence the leakage could be such that the seed always fails to extract randomness from the source. This is where we exploit the fact that the set of possible leakage functions is bounded: using a union bound, we show that if the randomness used by the encryption scheme is long enough, then with overwhelming probability a random seed can extract randomness from the source resulting from any leakage function. The following lemma captures the above idea. n → {0, 1} } be a class of (leakage) functions. Let H = {h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m } be a t-wise independent hash function family. If
then with probability at least (1 − δ) over h ← H, it holds that for every f ∈ F,
The proof of the lemma can be found in Appendix A, and relies on the ideas similar to those used by [46] to demonstrate deterministic extraction from sources computable by bounded size circuits. We now see how we can get a bounded-SRDM-secure encryption scheme from any secure encryption scheme. The following transformation is essentially identical to the one used in [33] but using different parameters. 5 Definition 5.4. For every polynomial s and p and encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec), define a new encryption scheme Π = (Gen , Enc , Dec ) as follows:
t(k)-wise independent family of hash functions where R(.) is the length of the randomness of Enc, R (.) is the length of the randomness of Enc ,
and
Output ((pk, h k ), sk).
• Enc (pk,h k ) (m) : r ← U R (k) ; output Enc pk (m; h k (r)).
• Dec sk (c) : output Dec sk (c).
We now show that the above construction transforms a CPA (resp., CCA) secure scheme to a bounded strong RDM (resp., CCA-RDM) secure scheme (which implies Theorem 5.2).
Lemma 5.5. Let s, p be polynomials. Let Π be a CPA (resp., CCA) secure public key encryption scheme, and Π be the transformed encryption scheme obtained from Definition 5.4. Then, Π is s-bounded p-strong RDM (resp., CCA-RDM) secure.
Proof. We start by proving the lemma for the case of CPA security. Assume for contradiction that there exists a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A that breaks the s-bounded p-strong RDM security of Π . That is, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher D and non-negligible function such that for all
We construct an adversary B that breaks the CPA security of Π. On input (pk, 1 k ), B samples h k ← H k and runs (f,
Note that the only difference in the experiments IND
A receives a randomness leakage f (r) and a ciphertext encrypted using h k (r), whereas in IND Π b (B, k), A receives f (r 1 ) but the ciphertext is encrypted using a fresh independent randomness r. Applying Lemma 5.3 with F being the class of s-bounded RDM functions and note that |F| ≤ 2 s(k) , with probability at least 1 − 2 −k over the choice of h k ← H k , the statistical distance between the two experiments conditioned on this h k is at most 2 −k . Therefore, the overall statistical distance is at most 2 −k+1 . This implies that
which is a contradiction. The above proof extends to the case of CCA security if we simply let the adversary B forward the decryption oracle queries of A, and forward back the answers.
It is clear that bounded strong RDM security implies RDM security. Additionally, bounded strong RDM security is strong enough to also imply bounded circular RDM security.
Theorem 5.6. For all l-bit public key encryption schemes Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec), if Π is s-bounded l-strong RDM secure (resp., CCA-RDM secure) then Π is s-bounded circular RDM secure (resp., CCA-RDM secure).
Proof. We start by proving the theorem for the case of CPA security.
where r 0 = r q(k) , c 0 is the empty string andc = c 1 , c 2 , . . . c q(k)
We define an adversary B that breaks the s-bounded l-strong RDM security of Π. On input (1 k , pk), B first runs f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f q(k) , state ← A 1 (1 k , pk) and outputs f 1 . Note that f 1 is computed by a circuit of size at most s(k) and
is not used otherwise). B outputs (f j (r j−1 , c j−1 ), 0) as (m 0 , m 1 ). On input c, B sets c j = c and computes for i = j + 1, . . . q(k), c i ← Enc pk (0; r i ). Finally B outputs A 2 (c, state) .
B is a probabilistic polynomial time adversary and for all k ∈ N, denoting B running with a fixed value of j as B j , we have, BSRDM
Since j is uniform in {1, 2, . . . q(k)} we have,
where ε is also non-negligible, which is a contradiction. The above proof extends to the case of CCA security if we simply let the adversary B forward the decryption oracle queries of A, and forward back the answers.
Bounded RDM Secure Encryption Schemes with Short Randomness
The above construction yields strong bounded RDM-secure encryption schemes where the length of the randomness is longer than the length of the message. We now provide a construction of a bounded RDM-secure and bounded circular RDM-secure encryption scheme that can encrypt arbitrarily long messages using "short" randomness. This construction, however, relies on stronger cryptographic assumption-namely, we require the existence of "lossy" trapdoor functions.
Definition 5.7 ([45])
. A tuple (GenLossy, GenInj, F, invert)) is an (n, u)-lossy trapdoor function if the following holds:
• (Lossy mode) For every k ∈ N and pk ← GenLossy(1 k ), the size of the range of F pk (.) (which takes as input strings of length n(k)) is at most 2 u(k) .
• The following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable
We turn to providing our construction of a bounded-RDM secure encryption scheme that can encrypt also "long" messages using "short" randomness-the ratio between the message-length and the randomness length is proportional to the lossiness of the trapdoor function. Formally, we establish the following theorem.
Theorem 5.8. Let l and R be the message length and randomness length parameters with R(k) ≥ k. Assuming the existence of (n, u)-lossy trapdoor functions with n ≥ 3(l + R) and u ≤ R/8, then for every polynomial s, there exist a l-bit s-bounded circular RDM secure encryption scheme with randomness length R.
In particular, assuming the DDH assumption holds, for every polynomial l, R, s with R(k) ≥ k, there exist a l-bit s-bounded circular RDM secure encryption scheme with randomness length R.
We mention that the "in particular" part of the theorem follows by the DDH-based construction of lossy trapdoor functions in [45] . Our construction is closely related to the "pad-thendeterministic" construction of hedged encryption schemes of Bellare et al [10] , where the encryption is done by first applying a invertible universal hash permutation h to the message-randomness pair (m||r) and then applying a lossy trapdoor function F pk to the hashed value. Recall that hedged encryption scheme already satisfy a notion of RDM security when restricting to RDM functions that do not depend on the public-key. To deal with RDM functions that depend on the public key, our key modification to their scheme is to replace the use of univeral hashing with t-wise independent hashing. However, since constructions of t-wise independent permutations are not known, to deal with arbitrary t-wise independent hash functions, we further modify the scheme to "pad" the message-randomness pair with a sufficiently long sequence of 0's.
Recall that the standard construction of t-wise independent hash functions is a degree t − 1 univariate polynomial over a prime field, which is invertible by the Berlekamp algorithm [?].
Definition 5.9. Let l, R, and s be the message length, randomness length, and size parameters with R(k) ≥ k. Let (GenLossy, GenInj, F, invert) be an (n, u)-lossy trapdoor function with publickey length v such that u ≤ R/8 and n = 3(l + R). Let t = 8(s + u + v + R) and H n = {h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n } be an invertible family of t(·)-wise independent hash functions. Define an l-bit s-bounded (circular) RDM-secure encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) with randomness length R as follows 6 :
• Gen(1 k ) : (pk, sk) ← GenInj(1 k ), h ← H n ; output ((pk, h), (sk, h)).
• Enc (pk,h) (m) : r ← U R(k) ; output c = F pk (h(m||r||0 2(l+R) )).
• Dec (sk,h) (c) : output the first l(k) bits of h −1 (invert sk (c)).
While our construction is bounded circular RDM secure, it is instructive to first focus on the bounded RDM security. Recall the security of the [10] scheme (which relies on a construction of deteministic encryption from [14] ) relies on a "crooked" version of leftover hash lemma [24] , which asserts that when F pk has small range size (which is the case in the lossy mode) and the source (m||r) has sufficient min-entropy and is independent of h, then F pk (h(m||r)) is statistically close to the "crooked" distribution F pk (U |m|+|r| ).
In our context, however, the adversary selects a s-bounded RDM function f after seeing the public key, and thus the source (f (r)||r||0 2(l+R) ) may be correlated with the hash function h (and also F pk ). We overcome this issue by using t-wise independent hashing and proving a crooked version of the deterministic extraction lemma from computationally bounded source of Trevisan and Vadhan [46] . The lemma asserts that with overwhelming probability over h ← H, the encryption F pk (f (r)||r||0 2(l+R) ) is statistically close to a corresponding crooked distribution F pk (U n ) for every lossy function F pk and every s-bounded RDM function f . Therefore, the s-bounded RMD security follows by switching to the lossy mode and applying the crooked deterministic extraction lemma. We proceed to state the crooked deterministic extraction lemma and prove the s-bounded RDM security of our scheme. The proof of Lemma 5.10 is deferred to Appendix B and follows similar techniques to those used by [46] .
Lemma 5.10 (Crooked Deterministic Extraction). Let H = {h : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1} n } be a t-wise independent hash function family. Let F = {f : {0, 1} n → R f } be a family of functions where each f ∈ F has range R f of size |R f | ≤ 2 m . Let C be a family of distributions over {0, 1} n such that every X ∈ C has min-entropy
then with probability at least (1 − δ) over h ← H, it holds that for every f ∈ F and every X ∈ C,
Lemma 5.11. The l-bit encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) constructed in Definition 5.9 is correct and s-bounded RDM secure.
Proof. We first show that Π is correct. Let S = {x||0 2(l+R) : x ∈ {0, 1} l+R }. Note that for
n is injective, then for every message m ∈ {0, 1} l , Dec (sk,h) (Enc (pk,h) (m)) = m with probability 1. Thus, it suffices to show that h| S is injective except with negligible probability, which follows directly by Lemma B.5.
For proving RDM security, we show that for every PPT adversary A, the view of A in both BRDM Π 0 and BRDM Π 1 are computationally indistinguishable to the same distribution (that is independent of the message and randomness used in the encryption).
Let b ∈ {0, 1}. Recall that in the experiment BRDM Π b (A, k), the adversary A receives (i) a public key (pk, h), where (pk, sk) ← GenInj(1 k ) and h ← H n , and (ii) a ciphtertext c = Enc (pk,h) (f b (r); r) = F pk (h(f b (r)||r||0 2(l+R) )), where r ← U R(k) and f b is a size-s RDM function generated by (f 0 , f 1 , state) ← A(1 k , pk). Thus, the view of A in BRDM Π b (A, k) can be described by (pk, h, c, σ), where σ is the internal randomness of A.
By the indistinguishability of the lossy and injective public keys of the lossy trapdoor functions, the view of A is computationally indistinguishable to the experiment where pk is instead generated in the lossy mode. Specifically, we refer to the view of A in the lossy mode as (pk, h, c, σ), where pk ← GenLossy(1 k ) and h c, σ are generated as above.
We now argue that the view of A in the lossy mode is statistically close to (pk, h, F pk (U n ), σ). Recall that in the lossy mode, F pk has range of size at most 2 u . Applying Lemma 5.10 with
size-s RDM function}, we have with probability at least (1 − 2 −u ) over h ← H, it holds that for every pk ← GenLossy(1 k ) and every size-s RDM function f , ∆(F pk (h(f (r)||r||0 2(l+R) )), F pk (U n )) ≤ 2 −u . Note that for such good h and for every lossy public-key pk, the statistical distance between the ciphertext c in the view of A and F pk (U n ) is at most 2 −u . It follows that the statistical distance between the view of A in the lossy mode and (pk, h, F pk (U n ), σ) is at most 2 −u + 2 −u ∈ negl(k).
Putting things together, we showed that for every PPT adversary A and b ∈ {0, 1}, the view of A in BRDM Π b is computationally indistinguishable to (pk, h, F pk (U n ), σ) where pk ← GenLossy(1 k ) and h ← H n and σ being the internal randomness of A, which clearly implies {BRDM Π 0 (A, k)} k and {BRDM Π 1 (A, k)} k are computationally indistinguishable.
We now turn to prove also circular RDM security of our scheme. To do this, we require the use of a generalized form of the above crooked deterministic extraction lemma that also deals with leakage (just as our "plain" deterministic extraction of leakage-source lemma, lemma 5.3), whose proof can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 5.12 (Crooked Deterministic Extraction from Bounded Leakage Sources
n → {0, 1} n } be a t-wise independent hash function family. Let F = {f : {0, 1} n → R f } be a family of functions where each f ∈ F has range R f of size |R f | ≤ 2 m . Let G = {g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n } be a family of functions. Let C be a family of distributions over {0, 1} n such that every X ∈ C has min-entropy H ∞ (X) ≥ k. If t ≥ 2(2m + log |F| + log |G| + log |C| + log(1/δ) + 3), m ≤ (k − 3 log(1/ε) − log t − 5)/2, then with probability at least (1 − δ) over h ← H, it holds that for every f ∈ F, g ∈ G, and X ∈ C,
Lemma 5.13. The l-bit encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) constructed in Definition 5.9 is s-bounded circular RDM secure.
Proof. The proof of circular RDM security follows the same line as the proof of Theorem 5.6 (recall that Theorem 5.6 shows that bounded strong RDM security implies bounded circular RDM security). Note that in the proof of Theorem 5.6, the strong RDM security is only used to show the indistinguishability of the last two hybrids, where the last message f q (r q−1 , c q−1 ) is replaced by 0 and the strong RDM security is used to simulate the first encryption Enc pk (f 1 (r q ); r 1 ) using randomness leakage f 1 (r q ) (whereas the indistinguishability of remaining hybrids relies only on the standard CPA security). In the current context, the message length may be longer than the randomness length so r q may have no randomness left after leaking f 1 (r q ). However, note that in the lossy mode, F pk has a small range and so r q has sufficient entropy left after conditioning on the first encryption F pk (h(f 1 (r q )||r 1 ||0 2(l+R )). Indeed, indistinguishability of these two hybrids follows in exactly the same way as in the proof of Theorem 5.11, but by relying on Lemma 5.12 instead of Lemma 5.10 (using F pk (h(f 1 (r q )||r 1 ||0 2(l+R )) as leakage).
RDM security in the Random Oracle model
In this section we see how we can achieve (full) RDM security in the Random oracle model. Our use of the random oracle model is extremely weak: we do not need to "program it", or "see queries to it". Additionally, security holds even if the attacker may get any inefficient non-uniform advice about the random oracle (as in the model of [47] ). We refer to such a model as the "ultra-weak" random oracle model, and omit a formal definition.
Definition 5.14. For every public key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec), define a new encryption scheme Π = (Gen , Enc , Dec ) using a random oracle RO :
where R is the length of randomness of Enc, m is the length of messages of Enc, and R (k) = R(k) + m(k) + 3k + log 2 k + 5 is the length of randomness of Enc .
• Gen (1 k ) := (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 k ). Output (pk, sk).
• Enc (pk, m) := Sample r ← U R (k) . Output Enc(pk, m; RO(r)).
• Dec (sk, c) := Output Dec(sk, c).
Theorem 5.15. For every non-uniformly secure CPA secure public key encryption scheme Π, Π as defined in Definition 5.14 is RDM secure in the ultra-weak random oracle model.
Proof. The theorem follows by essentially identical arguments to the proof of Theorem 5.5, by noting that (1) the above transformation is essentially the transformation defined in Definition 5.4 except that instead of applying h k , here we apply the random oracle RO for randomness extraction, and (2) a random oracle is a k log k -wise independent family of hash functions, and for any polynomial p and sufficiently large k
There is just a single point that needs to be addressed: how to deal with attackers that receive (inefficient) non-uniform advice about the random oracle. Note that since the randomness extraction lemma (i.e., Lemma 5.3) holds in a statistical sense, even conditioned on the "whole" hashfunction (which is the random oracle in this case), it thus also holds conditioned on a function of it (i.e., the non-uniform advice the attacker may get). The only difference is that since we start off with non-uniform attacker, we need to rely on the underlying scheme being non-uniformly secure.
Theorem 5.15, combined with Theorem 4.1, show the existence of a task-RDM secure encryptionthat can be achieved in the ultra-weak random oracle model (assuming the existence of CPA secure encryption schemes), but cannot be achieved in the plain model. As far as we know, this is the first separation between tasks achievable in such a weak random oracle model, and the plain model.
Barriers for RDM Security with Long Messages
An interesting question is whether any encryption schemes can be modified by just performing preprocessing to the randomness (as in Theorem 5.5) to become bounded RDM secure but still handle long messages using short randomness. In this section we demonstrate barriers to using black-box proofs of security to show RDM security of encryption scheme that handle messages that are longer than randomness, based on a computational intractability assumption. More specifically, we present black-box barriers to encrypt schemes with perfect correctness and efficiently recognizable publickeys that can encrypt long messages using short randomness. This shows that simply performing some processing on the randomness of an encryption scheme (as in the construction used in Theorem 5.5) does not suffice to make every encryption scheme resilient to bounded-RDM attacks if requiring that long message can be encrypted using short randomness. For instance, this means that the El-Gamal crypto system [] cannot be modified (by performing pre-processing to the randomness) to become bounded RDM secure for long messages.
Let us start by defining a falsifiable security game (following [39, 30, 26] ).
Definition 6.1. A falsifiable security game is an efficient random system Γ that on security parameter k interacts with an adversary A and outputs a bit, which we denote by A(1 k ) ↔ Γ(1 k ). We say Γ is secure if for all PPT A, P r[A(1 k ) ↔ Γ(1 k ) = 1] is negligible in k where the probability is over the randomness of A and Γ.
Our separation result applies to any black-box reduction (i.e., the reduction only accesses the attacker A as a black-box) that accesses the RDM function f as a black-box. Following the terminology used by [29] (in the context of key-dependent message security), we refer to such reductions as strongly black-box reductions. We point out that our proof of security in Section 5.1 is indeed strongly black-box.
Definition 6.2. [29]
A strongly black-box reduction from the p-bounded RDM security of a public key encryption scheme Π to the security of a falsifiable security game Γ is a PPT oracle aided machine R (.) such that for any adversary A that breaks the p-bounded RDM security of Π, R A breaks the security of Γ. Additionally, R treats the challenge RDM functions provided by A as a black-box.
More concretely, for any adversary A such that there exists a PPT distinguisher D, polynomial p and infinitely many k such that
there exists a polynomial p and infinitely many k such that
Our lower bound relies on the existence of a pseudorandom function family secure against subexponential-size circuits. Definition 6.3. Let m, r be polynomials. We say that a family of efficient functions F m,r k
where RF is a random oracle.
It is well-known that the existence of strong pseudorandom function families can be based on the existence of one-way functions with subexponential security [27, 32] We now have the following theorem. 
Then there exists a polynomial p such that the following holds. Consider any public-key encryption scheme Π with perfect correctness and efficiently recognizable public-keys, message length m and encryption randomness length r, and a secure falsifiable security game Γ. Then, there does not exist a strongly-black-box reduction from the p-bounded RDM security of Π to the security of Γ.
We now provide an overview of the proof. Assume we have a reduction R such that, for any adversary A that breaks the p-bounded RDM security of Π, R A breaks the security of the falsifiable security game Γ. For every valid public-key, due to the perfect correctness property of Π, we can always construct an inefficient adversary A that breaks the p-bounded RDM security of Π with probability 1 (and that simply outputs ⊥ in case the ciphertext it receives is invalid, or in case the public-key is invalid); we thus have that R A , though inefficient, breaks the security of Γ. Furthermore, we are guaranteed that R not only uses A as a black-box but also that the RDM function specified by A is used as a black-box. Now if the the RDM function chosen by A behaves like a random function then its range is "elusive"-that is, the only way to compute any image of the function is to query the RDM function in its pre-image. This allows us to efficiently simulate R A . Given that the reduction must treat the RDM function as a black-box, such queries can be seen by the simulator and knowing these queries allows it to circumvent the inefficiency of A; to efficiently simulate A correctly, we need to be able to efficiently recognize what public-keys are invalid (since such queries are answered ⊥ by A, even if R has correctly encrypted some message). 7 Now, our simulator is an efficient machine that breaks the security of Γ, and we have a contradiction. However, we require that the RDM function behaves as a random function, and a random function itself does not have a polynomial bound on its size. To this end, we use a pseudorandom function as the RDM function. Still, A is inefficient and could be used by the reduction to distinguish the pseudorandom function from a random function, in which case our simulation fails. To circumvent this, we use a pseudorandom function secure against subexponential sized adversaries and simply use this function with a sufficiently long seed to ensure security against A.
Proof. We start by choosing the polynomial p. Let t(·) be a polynomial time bound on the complexity of F m,r k , and ε ∈ (0, 1) be a constant such that the indistinguishability of F k = F m,r k holds against size 2 k ε distinguishers. Let k = r 2/ε , and set p(k) t(k ). Now, assume for contradiction that there exists a public-key encryption scheme Π with perfect correctness, message length m, and encryption randomness length r, a secure falsifiable security game Γ, and a strongly-black-box reduction R such that R reduces the p-bounded RDM security of Π to the security of Γ. Namely, for every adversary A that breaks the p-bounded RDM security of Π, R A breaks the security of Γ while using both A and the RDM functions chosen by A as blackboxes. In this case, we shall show that the security of Γ can be broken by an efficient adversary, a contradiction to the assumed security of Γ.
Towards this goal, we first define an (inefficient) "canonical" adversary A that breaks the pbounded RDM security of Π . It follows that R A breaks the security of Γ with non-negligible probability. We then construct an efficient "meta-reduction" M that internally emulates R A efficiently and breaks the security of Γ with essentially the same probability, which completes the proof.
We now construct the (inefficient) canonical adversary A for breaking the p-bounded RDM security of Π. For every s ∈ {0, 1} k define A s as follows:
• On input (1 k , pk), A s checks if pk is a valid public-key given the security parameter k; if not it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it chooses the RDM function f = f s ∈ F k and output (f, state) where state = (f, pk). 8
• On input the challenge ciphertext (c * , state) (for a valid public-key pk), A s checks for all r ∈ {0, 1} r(k) whether c * = Enc pk (f (r); r). If there is such an r then output a bit b = 0 else output b = 1.
It is easy to see that for every s, A s breaks the p-bounded RDM security of Π. Hence for every s, R As breaks the security of Γ. Hence, this also holds true for a random s. We define R A as R As where s ← {0, 1} k and we have that R A breaks the security of Γ. More concretely, there exists a polynomial p such that for infinitely many k
We proceed to construct an efficient meta-reduction M that interacts with Γ by internally emulating R A efficiently and forwarding R's messages to Γ and back. Notice that emulating R A efficiently is easy except that in order to generate the message b , we needs to enumerate over all randomness r, which takes time O(2 r ) and is inefficient. Instead, M maintains a list of queries L made by R to the corresponding RDM function f (recall that R treats f as an oracle, and thus M sees that queries of R to f ) and on input the challenge ciphertext c * generates b by checking for all q ∈ L whether Enc pk (f (q); q) = c * . If there is such a q, M sets b = 0 else it sets b = 1. It is not hard to see that by simulating b this way, M can emulate the execution of R A in polynomial time.
To show a contradiction it remains to show that M breaks the security of Γ with non-negligible probability. Let Hybrid ineff = Γ(1 k ) ↔ R A (1 k ) and Hybrid eff = Γ(1 k ) ↔ M (1 k ). We prove that, for every k, |P r[Hybrid ineff = 1] − P r[Hybrid eff = 1]| ≤ (k) for some negligible via a hybrid argument.
Let A f be the adversary obtained by replacing the f s in A s with the function f . More precisely, A f behaves just as A s except that on input (pk, 1 k ), A f outputs f as the RDM function. We define R A as R A RF here RF is a random function from {0, 1} r(k) to {0, 1} m(k) . Similarly M behaves just as M except that it uses a random function RF instead of a pseudorandom function. We define hybrids Proof. In both Hybrid RF ineff and Hybrid RF eff , the RDM function f is a random function RF . Note that in Hybrid RF ineff a ciphertext query c * is answered by using the canonical attacker A by finding the unique (by perfect correctness) message m = f (r) encrypted as c * = Enc(f (r); r), and is answered as 1 if such an r exists, and as 0 otherwise. On the other hand, in Hybrid RF eff , the meta-reduction M provides the correct message m = f (r) if and only if R has queried the RDM function on an input r such that c * = Enc(f (r); r); if c = Enc(f (r), r) for any r, then M outputs 0 just as A does. To show that Hybrid RF ineff and Hybrid RF eff are statistically close, it suffices to show the probability that R asks some ciphertext query c * = Enc(f (r); r) without first querying the RDM function on r, is negligible. Since R makes at most a polynomial number of ciphertext queries, by a union bound, it suffices to bound the probability that R makes a single query c * = Enc(f (r); r) without having queried the RDM function on r. By perfect correctness, we have that for any fixed value c, and any fixed random string r, the probability over the random function RF that c = Enc(f (r); r)) is upper bounded by 2 −m(k) . It follows by a union bound that for every fixed string c * , the probability over the choice of the random function RF that there exists some r such that c = Enc(f (r); r) is upper bounded by 2 r /2 m , which is negligible in k. The same holds for any choice of random variable c * . This concludes the proof of the claim. Claim 6.6. Hybrid RF eff and Hybrid eff are statistically close.
Proof. Both Hybrid RF eff and Hybrid eff are PPT and differ only in the usage of a random function RF in one and a function f ← F k in the other. Hence the claim follows directly from the pseudorandomness property of F k and the fact that Γ outputs a single bit. Claim 6.7. Hybrid RF ineff and Hybrid ineff are statistically close.
Proof. Again Hybrid RF ineff and Hybrid ineff differ only in the usage of a random function RF in one and a function f ← F k in the other. However both run in time at most p(k)2 r(k) which is at most 2 k . By the strong pseudorandomness of F k and the fact that Γ outputs a single bit we have that Hybrid RF ineff and Hybrid ineff are statistically close..
The above three claims complete the hybrid argument and consequently the proof.
Randomness Dependent Security in Commitment Schemes
In this section we consider RDM security for commitment schemes. To contrast our result with those for encryption schemes, we consider a setting as close as possible to the encryption case; that is, we consider non-interactive commitment schemes in the Common Reference String (CRS) model. In essence, non-interactive commitment schemes in the CRS model differ from encryption schemes in two ways: 1) for commitment schemes, there is not necessarily an efficient way to decrypt messages, and 2) for commitment schemes, on the other hand, we require a binding property.
We proceed to formally defining commitment schemes in the CRS model. Definition 7.
1. An l-bit (non-interactive) commitment scheme in the CRS model consists of a tuple (Gen, Com) of PPT algorithms where (i) Gen takes a security parameter 1 k as input and generates a common reference string crs ← Gen(1 k ), (ii) Com takes crs and a message m in a message space {0, 1} l(k) as input and generates a commitment c ← Com(crs, m).
Definition 7.2. We say an l-bit non-interactive commitment scheme in the CRS model (Gen, Com) is secure if the following conditions hold:
• Computational Hiding: For every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), the ensembles {IND 0 (A, k)} k and {IND 1 (A, k)} k are computationally indistinguishable, where We may now define RDM security in exactly the same way as RDM security for encryption schemes. Definition 7.3. A secure l-bit commitments scheme in the CRS model (Gen, Com) is randomnessdependent message secure (RDM-secure)) if for every PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), the ensembles {RDM 0 (A, k)} k∈N and {RDM 1 (A, k)} k∈N are computationally indistinguishable where
The RDM functions f b are represented as circuits from {0, 1} |r| to {0, 1} l(k)
Lower bound
We first remark that our impossibility result for "full" RDM security for encryption schemes directly extends also to commitment schemes. 
Let us now argue that the analog of this property also holds for commitment schemes; that is This holds since if committing to 0 and 1 (using the same randomness) results in identical commitments, with non-negligible probability, then even the honest sender can later decommit to both 0 and 1 with non-negligible probability and break the computational binding property.
Remark. We remark that the proof also extends to interactive commitments. Recall that in the non-interactive case, RDM attacker applied a uniformly selected hashfunction to the commitment and selected the bit v to commit to so as to bias the output of the hashfunction. In the interactive setting, the RDM attacker acts as an honest receiver using some uniformly selected randomness r R , and next picks RDM functions that emulate an interaction between the honest sender (using his actual randomness) and the honest receiver using randomness r R , applies a hashfunction to the complete transcript of the interaction, and finally picks the bit b so as to bias the output of the hashfunction. It follows using the same argument as above that such an attacker violates RDM security, unless computational binding of the commitment is broken (with non-negligible probability over the choice of the CRS, and the receiver's randomness).
Upper bounds
Since "full" RDM security is impossible to achieve, as with encryption schemes, we define RDM security with respect to a priori bounded RDM functions.
Definition 7.5. For every s : N → N a secure l-bit (non-interactive) commitment scheme in the CRS model (Gen, Com) is s-bounded RDM secure if for every PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), the ensembles {BRDM 0 (A, k)} k∈N and {BRDM 1 (A, k)} k∈N are computationally indistinguishable where
and f : {0, 1} |r| → {0, 1} l(k) is a function computed by a circuit of size at most s(k).
We note that exactly same construction as that for bounded RDM security for encryption schemes works for also non-interactive commitments in the CRS model. Definition 7.6. For every polynomial s and (non-interactive) l-bit commitment scheme in the CRS model (Gen, Com), define a new l-bit commitment scheme in the CRS model (Gen , Com ) as
wise independent family of hash functions where R(.) is the length of the randomness of Com, R (.) is the length of the randomness of Com ,
Output (crs, h k ).
• Com ((crs, h k ), m) := r ← U R (k) . Output Com(crs, m; h k (r)).
Theorem 7.7. Let s be a polynomial. Let (Gen, Com) be a secure l-bit commitment scheme in the CRS model, and (Gen , Com ) be the transformed commitment scheme obtained from Definition 7.6. Then, (Gen , Com ) is s-bounded RDM secure.
Proof. Note that the above construction for bounded RDM-secure commitment schemes is the exactly the same as the one we used for encryption schemes, except that public key is replaced by the CRS and the encryption scheme is replaced by a commitment commitment scheme (and thus, there may not exist an efficient decryption procedure). However the proof of Theorem 5.5 does not rely on the existence of an efficient decryption procedure, and thus exactly the same proof applies also for commitments schemes. That is, it follows that the transformed commitment scheme is bounded RDM-secure. It remains to show the computational binding property of (Gen , Com ). Note that an opening (m 0 , r 0 , m 1 , r 1 ) for (Gen , Com ) constitutes an opening (m 0 , h k (r 0 ), m 1 , h k (r 1 )) for the original scheme. Hence computational binding of (Gen , Com ) follows from the computational binding property of of (Gen, Com).
We finally note that (in contrast to Theorem 6.4), for the case of commitments, it is easy to construct a bounded RDM secure commitments schemes that use "short" randomness to commit to "long" messages. Definition 7.8. For every polynomial m and l-bit commitment scheme in the CRS model (Gen, Com) define a m-bit commitment scheme in the CRS model (Gen , Com ) as follows
• We define Gen as sampling h ← H k and appending h to the common reference string generated by running Gen, where {H k } k is a Collision Resistant Hash function family with H k from {0, 1} m(k) to {0, 1} l(k) .
• We define Com as just applying h its m-bit long message and using Com on the shortened l-bit message. We construct PPT B that contradicts the computational binding property of (Gen, Com) as follows: On input (1 k , crs), B samples h ← H k , runs (m 0 , m 1 , r 0 , r 1 ) ← A(1 k , (crs, h)) and outputs (h(m 0 ), h(m 1 ), r 0 , , r 1 ). By the collision resistance of H k we have that the probability h(m 0 ) = h(m 1 ) is negligible, otherwise B has efficiently found a collision on a h ← H k . Hence we have that B breaks the computational binding property of (Gen, Com) with non-negligible probability and we have a contradiction. The RDM hiding property of (Gen , Com ) follows by that of (Gen, Com). Any RDM query f (.) on the new scheme Com can be simulated by the slightly more "complex" RDM query h(f (.)) on the original scheme Com. If f (.) was evaluated by a circuit of size at most s(k) then h(f (.)) is evaluated by a circuit of size at most s(k) + p(k). Hence assuming a PPT attacker that breaks the s-bounded RDM hiding property of (Gen , Com ) we can construct a PPT attacker that breaks the s + p-bounded RDM hiding property of (Gen, Com). Com uses randomness of the same length as Com. This concludes the proof.
Proof. Let k = n− −log(1/ε)−1. Consider any f ∈ F. By applying Lemma A.2 to the distribution (f (U n ), U n ) with the parameter ε set to be ε/2, we obtain that with probability at least (1 − ε/2) over z ← f (U n ), the distribution X f,z U n | f (Un)=z has min-entropy H ∞ (X) ≥ k.
Noting that m ≤ k − 2 log(1/(ε/2)) − log t − 2, Lemma A.1 implies that for every X over {0, 1}
n with H ∞ (X) ≥ k, with probability at least 1 − 2 −t/2 over h ← H, ∆(h(X), U m ) ≤ ε/2. By an union bound over f ∈ F and z ∈ {0, 1} such that the corresponding H ∞ (X f,z ) ≥ k, it follows that with probability at least 1 − 2 −t/2 · |F | · 2 ≥ 1 − δ over h ← H, for every f ∈ F and z ∈ {0, 1} such that the corresponding H ∞ (X f,z ) ≥ k, we have ∆(h(X f,z ), U m ) ≤ ε/2. For such h ∈ H, we have for every f ∈ F,
as desired.
B Proofs of Crooked Version Lemmas
Let us first recall a tail bound for t-wise independent random variables: The following lemma is a crooked version of Lemma A.1 and is proved in a similar way.
Lemma B.2. Let H = {h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n } be a t-wise independent hash function family, f : {0, 1} n → R be an arbitrary function with range R of size |R| ≤ 2 m . Let X be a distribution over {0, 1} n with min-entropy H ∞ (X) ≥ k. If m ≤ k − 2 log(1/ε) − log t − 2, then Proof. W.l.o.g., we can assume that |R| = 2 m and X is a flat source, i.e., X is uniform over a subset S ⊂ {0, 1} n of size |S| = 2 k . Let M = 2 m and K = 2 k . Fix a z ∈ R, and let µ z = Pr[f (U n ) = z]. Note that for every x ∈ {0, 1} n , Pr[f (H(x)) = z] = µ z and {f (H(x))} x∈{0,1} n are t-wise independent. By the tail bound for t-wise independent random variables, with probability at least 1 − 2 −(t/2−3) over h ← H, 
